

AAI'26

By the Strike of the Gavel.

TRAIN

UNSC AGENDA ITEM:

PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR IN
THE MENA REGION TO AVERT THE
POSSIBILITY OF THE WORLD WAR

III

UNDER SECRETARY-GENERAL:
SACİT EREN TUNCER

UNDER SECRETARY-GENERAL:
BARAN İNCE

ACADEMIC ASSISTANT:
MEHMET EMRE UYANIK

1) Welcoming Letters.....	3
a) Letter from the Secretary General.....	3
b) Letter from the Under Secretaries General.....	3
c) Letter from the Academic Assistant.....	5
2) Introductions.....	5
a) Introduction to the Committee.....	5
b) Introduction to the Agenda Item.....	6
3) Countries with Nuclear Weapons or Suspected Programs.....	7
4) Effects of Nuclear Weapon Usage in the Region.....	11
a) Humanitarian Effects.....	11
b) Environmental Effects.....	12
c) Economic Effects.....	13
5) International Law and Agreements.....	15
a) UNs Sight upon Nuclear Weapon Usage.....	15
b) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.....	16
c) International Atomic Energy Agency.....	16
d) Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.....	17
6) Policies of the Countries.....	18
a) Western / Pro-Israel Axis(US Bloc).....	18
b) Resistance Axis(Iran Bloc).....	19
c) Non-Aligned / Swinged States.....	20
Timeline.....	21
Committee’s Flow.....	21
Our Expectations.....	21
8) Questions to Ponder.....	22

1) Welcoming Letters

a) Letter from the Secretary General

Firstly, it is with immense pride and enthusiasm that I extend my warmest welcomes to all participants of the Antalya Anatolian High School Train Model United Nations Conference 2026, taking place on April 11th-12th in Antalya.

I am Güney Deniz Ala, Secretary-General of this distinguished conference. It is both an honor and a privilege to lead this organization in this position. Model United Nations has always been far more than a simulation, it is a journey. Whether you're a more experienced delegate or a first-timer, with AALTRAIN'26 I promise unparalleled growth and inspiration.

Our Academic Team: Under-Secretary Generals, Academic Assistants, and Board Members, represent the finest minds in Antalya, each meticulously selected to deliver your committees of exceptional caliber. From beginner to advanced committees, every session has been crafted for the maximum impact.

My deepest gratitude goes to our Principal Mr. Kılıç and our dedicated advisor Mrs. Bilici, whose unwavering support made this vision reality. I extend special thanks to the AALTRAIN'26 participants, whose passion set the standard we strive to exceed, and a personal note of appreciation to my Executive Team whose brilliance knows no bounds.

As we gather, let us draw inspiration from the eternal words of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of modern Turkey:

"Ey Türk gençliği! Birinci vazifen, Türk istiklâlini, Türk Cumhuriyeti'ni, ilelebet muhafaza ve müdafaa etmektir. Mevcudiyetinin ve istikbalinin yegâne temeli budur. Bu temel, senin en kıymetli hazinendir."

To delegates: embrace the challenge, defend your interests, and leave AALTRAIN'26 having elevated your voice on the world stage. I am eager to witness your brilliance.

Sincerely,

Güney Deniz Ala

Secretary-General, AALTRAIN'26

Antalya Anatolian High School

b) Letter from the Under Secretaries General

Honorable participants of the UNSC,

I am Baran İnce and I welcome you all to our committee The Futuristic United Nations Security Council(F-UNSC),

First of all I would like to start my letter by thanking to the secretariat of the AALTRAIN'26 for inviting me to this conference as an Under-Secretary-General to make a committee like F-UNSC,

Up next I want to deliver my warm thanks to my Co-Under-Secretary-General Sacit and to my Academic Assistant Mehmet Emre for helping me,

Later on I would like to express my feelings about this committee, we chose this committee because of many reasons and we wanted it to be special, which is why we are doing F-UNSC in a conference like AALTRAIN'26,

Nowadays one of the biggest possible threat is nuclear weapons which we should have some attention on it, if this goes more like this a possible world war III will be welcoming us, we wanted to make a futuristic possibility of this and see what you have got on your minds about it,

To see those things you will be needing to study as hard as you can before the committee, because our committee will be asking you to have lot of informations about your delegations' policies and past actions upon everything but especially this agenda item which is the nuclear weapons,

I am looking forward to see you all in the conference, until then take care of yourselves and study hard,

If you have any question marks on your minds please feel free to ask me by my e-mail address and phone number written down below,

Sincerely,

Baran İNCE

baranince88@gmail.com

+905522972107

Distinguished participants of this committee,

As you all are familiar with, I am Sacit Eren TUNCER and I would like to honorably welcome you all to the "The Futuristic United Nations Security Council (F-UNSC)". In our committee I will be serving as your Under Secretary General during the long awaited days of this prestigious conference.

First and Foremost I would like to deliver my special gratitudes to our Secretariat Team, Güneş Deniz and Ata Yankı for assembling this sublime conference. Afterwards I want to

give a huge shoutout to my dear Co Under Secretary General Baran and Academic Assistant Mehmet Emre for their excellent work in order to make our committee happen.

Regarding our committee; We as your Academic Team Members, want you to avert the aforementioned possibilities of this exponentially growing threats that caused by nuclear weapons. As your Under Secretary General i am fully encouraging you to pay your attention to this study guide and have an elaborated research upon our committee.

I frankly wish this committee will be an unforgettable and productive experience that contributes to your career and skills.

If you have any kind of questions prior to the conference, do not hesitate to contact me. You can reach me through my e-mail, erenter999@gmail.com

Sincerely,

Sacit Eren TUNCER

c) Letter from the Academic Assistant

Fellow Delegates

First of all I would like to begin with introducing myself. I am Mehmet Emre Uyanık, and I will be serving as the Academic Assistant of this amazing committee. I want to deliver my special thanks to the Executive team and my Under-Secretaries General, Baran and Sacit. It is an immense honour for me to fulfill this role and serve as an Academic Assistant for such an outrageous conference.

I believe with all of my heart that in this committee and in this conference you all are going to find such quality chances to develop yourselves both academically and socially. But these of course require some commitment to achieve it. The only things you need to do is to read this study guide carefully and do some extra research to understand the topic and your role in this committee better. This topic is perhaps a bit complicated but I know that you are going to understand it after reading the study guide carefully.

Even if you do not understand the topic or the guide or if you have any questions regarding anything about the committee you may reach out to me via whatsapp. Please do not hesitate

to ask your questions because they are so important for the flow of the committee. From now on I wish great success to you all!

Academic Assistant

Mehmet Emre Uyanık

+90 552 461 58 33

2) Introductions

a) Introduction to the Committee

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Its powers, outlined in the UN Charter, include establishing peacekeeping operations, authorizing military action, and imposing international sanctions. Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council may identify threats to international peace, determine breaches of that peace, and authorize responses up to and including the use of force. It is the only UN body with the authority to issue resolutions binding on all member states. The Council also recommends the admission of new member states to the United Nations General Assembly and approves changes to the Charter.

The Security Council consists of 15 members: 5 permanent members—the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom—and 10 non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. The five permanent members, who were the great powers among the Allies of World War II or their recognised successor states, each hold veto power over substantive resolutions, enabling any one of them to block adoption of a draft resolution regardless of the level of support among other members. This veto right does not carry over into General Assembly matters or votes, which are non-binding. The presidency rotates monthly among all fifteen members in English alphabetical order.

Created in 1945 after World War II to succeed the League of Nations in maintaining international order, the Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House, Westminster, in London. During the Cold War, it was largely paralysed by rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, though it authorised interventions in the Korean War and the Congo Crisis and deployed peacekeepers to Cyprus and the Sinai Peninsula. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, peacekeeping expanded dramatically: the Council authorised major operations in Kuwait, Namibia, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Somalia, among others. In the 2020s, the Council has faced renewed paralysis, with repeated vetoes by Russia over the war in Ukraine and by the United States over the war in Gaza, prompting fresh calls for structural reform.

Resolutions of the Security Council are enforced in part through UN peacekeeping missions, comprising military, police, and civilian personnel voluntarily provided by member states. As

of December 2024, there were 11 active peacekeeping missions with approximately 70,000 personnel from over 120 contributing countries, funded through an approved annual budget of approximately US \$5.6 billion.

b) Introduction to the Agenda Item

Agenda Item: Preventing a nuclear war in the MENA region to avert the possibility of the world war III

Our agenda item is chosen specially by the academic team members of UNSC, if we consider nowadays politics this is a probable outcome of our world -by the way we chose this agenda item before the usa-iran war so anything could happen in the future-,

In the past nuclear weapon usage has caused a lot of damage to our world and people know the consequences of the usage of nuclear weapons but they don't care, especially countries executive staffs and we can do nothing about it, all we can do is raise awareness starting by our environment, this might sound funny but it is not and it is important, but what would have happened if you were in the seats of those executive staffs that we have mentioned before?

With our agenda item and our committee we will simulate it together and do not forget that we are excited as much as you are.

3) Countries with Nuclear Weapons or Suspected Programs

Israel

Israel has an official policy of ambiguity with respect to nuclear weapons. It has never confirmed or denied possessing nuclear weapons and has never conducted a nuclear test. However, it is universally acknowledged that Israel has a nuclear weapons capability which it developed outside the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Israel's lack of transparency means that figures are uncertain, but the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) outlines estimates between 90 and 300 nuclear weapons. SIPRI also reports that since 2021, according to commercial satellite imagery, there has been significant construction taking place at the Negev Nuclear Research Centre near Dimona, in southern Israel. Some may remember that the great Israeli nuclear whistle-blower, Mordechai Vanunu, worked as a technician at Dimona, before revealing details of the secret Israeli nuclear programme to the British press in 1986.

SIPRI information indicates that Israel has air, land and sea-based delivery systems for its nuclear arsenal. Bombs can be dropped from planes, either the F-161 or the F-15 aircraft, and are likely to be stored near air force bases such as Tel Nof airbase in central Israel, or Hatzirim airbase in the Negev desert. Reportedly, when Israel sent six F-16s from

Tel Nof to Britain for an exercise in 2019, a US official referred to this as Israel's 'nuclear squadron'.

Israel's nuclear weapons can also be launched on land-based Jericho ballistic missiles. The site of these missiles is thought to be the Sdot Micha Airbase near Zecharia, about 25 kilometres west of Jerusalem. Israel also operates five German-built Dolphin-class diesel-electric submarines which operate from the port of Haifa on the Mediterranean coast. Some or all of these subs may have been equipped to launch a nuclear-armed cruise missile.

By any estimate, this is a formidable array of weapons of mass destruction and it gives Israel the capacity to inflict catastrophic damage on its neighbours. Of course the impact on Israel of any regional use would be considerable too but there is absolutely no guarantee that would deter an Israeli government from nuclear use if it considered its existence was under threat. How such a threat would be defined is also unknown. The fact remains that nuclear-weapons possession allows Israel to act with impunity, in Gaza, and in the wider region. And that possession is also impacting on how others are willing to relate to Israel.

Iran

As of mid-2025, Iran is considered a nuclear threshold state with the technical capability to produce enough weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for multiple nuclear weapons in a matter of weeks, following significant advancements in its enrichment capacity and further escalation, while also having faced severe setbacks to its facilities from 2025 air strikes.

One of the goals of the now-defunct 2015 nuclear agreement was to place limits on Iran's nuclear activity so that it would take the country at least a year to produce a weapon, giving world governments a fair amount of warning to respond.

However, following the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018, Iran has expanded its nuclear enrichment activities and limited international inspections of its nuclear facilities, the last of which occurred in 2021.

In December 2024, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi told Reuters that Tehran was "dramatically" ramping up uranium enrichment to up to 60 percent, close to the roughly 90 percent weapons-grade threshold. By February 2025, U.S. intelligence indicated that a covert team of scientists in Iran was orchestrating a faster, though cruder, approach to creating an atomic weapon. Then in January 2026, Grossi said Iran was "less than satisfactory" in "a number of respects" regarding its nuclear cooperation, and that countries don't have an "à la carte" option to choose what part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty they wish to comply with. He added that the IAEA struggled to carry out its inspections in some areas of Iran amid civil unrest.

Iran is engaged in nuclear-related activities at more than a dozen locations across the country. Its largest enrichment facility is at Natanz, which was a target in both the 2025 and 2026 strikes, while its sole nuclear power plant is at Bushehr, on the Persian Gulf coast.

Another IAEA report released in May 2025 concluded that Iran had also carried out undeclared nuclear activities at three previously unknown bases: Lavisan-Shian, Turquzabad, and Varamin.

As demonstrated in its air strikes against Israel in 2024, Iran has varied air power capabilities, including deep and diverse arsenals of cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as drones. U.S. intelligence analysts say that Iran has the largest ballistic missile inventory in the Middle East. (Ballistic missiles take a parabolic path through the atmosphere, traveling much faster than drones and cruise missiles, and are generally harder to intercept.)

Many foreign policy experts warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be an acute threat to Israel and pose a major challenge to the interests of the United States and its partners in the Middle East. Some regional analysts fear that a nuclear-armed Iran would likely be emboldened to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy, not only in the region but via its growing military and economic partnerships with U.S. rivals China and Russia. Iran has recently provided Russia with various weapon systems, including drones and shorter-range ballistic missiles, to help supplement its forces battling against Ukraine.

There is also concern that Iran's acquisition of these weapons will incentivize other countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, to pursue them as well, which could catalyze a dangerous nuclear arms race.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia currently has no nuclear weapons or active nuclear weapons program, but it possesses the financial resources and has expressed intent to acquire them if regional rival Iran does. The Kingdom is developing a civilian nuclear program, with plans for reactors by 2040, and maintains that its efforts are peaceful.

Although Saudi Arabia does not possess weapons of mass destruction, Saudi officials have expressed that they will acquire nuclear weapons if their regional rival, Iran, does. Since its 2015 intervention in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has been the target of missile attacks by Houthi militias.

For over a decade, policymakers and analysts have warned of a nuclear domino in the Middle East: Tehran crosses the threshold, and Riyadh races to match it. This perception has been reinforced not only by Western and Israeli commentary but also by statements from senior Saudi figures. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has reiterated on multiple

occasions, including in 2018 and 2023, that Saudi Arabia would develop a nuclear weapon if Iran did, a position that echoed earlier statements by former intelligence chief Turki al-Faisal in 2011. Yet “reactive proliferation” has been rare in the nuclear age. Far more common has been restraint, hedging, and the search for alternative forms of deterrence short of weaponization. Public rhetoric, especially in highly securitized regional environments, often serves signaling purposes rather than imminent policy decisions

Saudi Arabia’s evolving nuclear calculus reflects a broader reassessment of Gulf threat perceptions. It is shaped not only by Iran’s program but also by eroding U.S. security guarantees, Israel’s growing assertiveness, the risk of a hardliner in Tehran pursuing a North Korea-style dash to the bomb, and Riyadh’s own ambitions for strategic autonomy. Yet contrary to alarmist narratives, these developments are unlikely to trigger precipitous nuclearization. Historical experience shows that states rarely pursue costly weapons programs solely in response to rivals, doing so only when regime survival is acutely threatened and credible security guarantees are absent. For Saudi Arabia, the challenge lies less in an imminent Iranian bomb than in the gradual weakening of the external security framework it has long relied upon.

Iran’s experience with nuclear latency offers a central lesson that what once functioned as protection and bargaining power can turn into strategic exposure. For years, Tehran leveraged its threshold status to extract concessions and signal deterrent potential. Yet after October 7, 2023, Israel appeared even less willing to tolerate a regional adversary hovering near nuclear capability. Iran’s reliance on latency misfired as technical progress alone cannot shield a state from attack or guarantee diplomatic gains. Going forward, states considering nuclear paths will weigh how their programs might be perceived, and whether geopolitical conditions favor or undermine a hedging approach, in which case swift weaponization might end up being the safer bet.

For Riyadh, Iran’s trajectory provides both warning and incentive. Although Iranian advances prompted Saudi officials to signal interest in comparable capabilities, the kingdom’s nuclear calculus extends beyond Tehran’s enrichment levels. Even if Iran were constrained, Riyadh appears intent on mastering the fuel cycle with Washington’s help despite China’s readiness to engage. The objective seems less about rapid weaponization and more about preserving long-term options by anchoring technical autonomy while remaining formally within NPT commitments. In a region shaped by deep-seated mistrust, Israel’s undeclared arsenal outside the treaty, earlier proliferation efforts in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Iran, and recurrent strikes on nuclear infrastructure, aspirations for sensitive capabilities are unlikely to dissipate regardless of how the U.S. and Israeli war on Iran ends and whether Tehran ultimately builds a nuclear weapon.

Egypt

Egypt does not have an active nuclear weapons program and is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), committing it to peaceful nuclear energy use. Currently, Egypt is developing a massive 4,800-megawatt nuclear power plant at El-Dabaa with Russia, intended solely for electricity generation.

The proposed nuclear facility at Dabaa is one such attempt to satisfy future energy needs. The project's first phase entails the construction of four third-generation reactors capable of producing a total of 4,800 megawatts within the next twelve years, and the site can accommodate an additional four reactors. Russia's state-owned firm Rosatom will build the reactors; the \$25 billion loan will finance 85 percent of the project, with Cairo paying the remainder. Egypt will eventually repay the loan at 3 percent interest, over a twenty-two-year period that begins in 2029.

Apart from Russia, nuclear cooperation agreements are in place with China (2006) and South Korea (2013). In May 2015 China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) signed an agreement with the NPPA to enhance nuclear cooperation and to “become an official partner” in the country’s nuclear project.

In July 2015 it was reported that Korea Electric Power Co and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) were making a combined bid to build 4000-6000 MWe in Egypt. Other proposals from China are reported. In November 2015 the government said the second set of four units would be put out to international tender.

In November 2016 the NPPA was working with WorleyParsons on a two-year project in the El Nagila area 80km east of Port Said to identify a suitable site for a second nuclear power plant.

Earlier in 1964 a 150 MWe nuclear plant with 20,000 m³/day desalination capacity was proposed, then in 1974 a 600 MWe plant was proposed for Sidi Kreir near Alexandria. The government's NPPA was then established in 1976, and in 1978 plans were drawn up for ten reactors by 1999 with 7200 MWe capacity, at Sidi Kreir, Al Arish, Cairo and in Upper Egypt. Talks then with French, German and Austrian interests as well as Westinghouse came to nothing.

4) Effects of Nuclear Weapon Usage in the Region

The consequences of nuclear weapons are catastrophic. Nuclear weapons are not like other weapons, they are designed to mass murder civilians, wipe out entire cities and cause irreversible harm to the environment. First responders like the Red Cross have warned that they would have no capacity to deal with a nuclear detonation, and if the conflict were to escalate into nuclear war, recent studies show over 5 billion people could die from the famine that follows.

a) Humanitarian Effects

Nuclear weapon detonation causes catastrophic humanitarian consequences, including immediate mass casualties, widespread infrastructure destruction, and long-term radioactive contamination. Blast, heat, and radiation can kill millions, cause untreatable injuries, and trigger global climate disruptions, such as famine. No adequate humanitarian response is possible after such an event.

Evidence of the foreseeable impacts of a nuclear detonation is an integral part of a nuclear weapons risk assessment. Although nuclear weapons have not been used in armed conflict since 1945, there has been a disturbingly high number of close calls in which nuclear weapons were nearly used inadvertently as a result of miscalculation or error.[27] During the three conferences on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons in 2013 and 2014, it was demonstrated that the risks of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, stem notably from:

- The vulnerability of nuclear weapon command-and-control networks to human error and cyberattacks
- The maintaining of nuclear arsenals on high levels of alert, with thousands of weapons ready to be launched within minutes
- The dangers of access to nuclear weapons and related materials by non-state actors.

Evidence of the immediate and longer-term impacts of the use and testing of nuclear weapons has been the subject of scientific investigation ever since. In a major 1987 report, the World Health Organization (WHO) summarized existing research into the impacts on health and health services of nuclear detonations. The report noted *inter alia* that the blast wave, thermal wave, radiation and radioactive fallout generated by nuclear explosions have devastating short- and long-term effects on the human body, and that existing health services are not equipped to alleviate these effects in any significant way. Since then, the body of evidence of the immediate and longer-term humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons use and testing, and of the preparedness and capacity of national and international organizations and health systems to provide assistance to the victims of such events, has been growing steadily.

b) Environmental Effects

The 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an important mechanism for halting the production of nuclear weapons and their resulting environmental impacts. The NPT, by constraining the continued development of nuclear weapons, can act as a means to prevent further radioactive contamination to the environment.

The production of nuclear weapons has created not only the threat of nuclear destruction on an immediate level through nuclear war, but also on a continual and protracted level through the creation of nuclear waste. The ‘clean up’ and environmental restoration of

the US DOE's nuclear weapons complex (and other nuclear facilities worldwide) is regarded as one of the most costly and difficult projects ever undertaken. New technologies will need to be developed in order to retrieve radioactive materials which have been released into the environment either through accident or by design. The dumping of nuclear wastes into bodies of water as well as the burial of radioactive materials is particularly troubling.

In the United States, major water systems including the Columbia River, Savannah River and the Snake River aquifer have been contaminated. From 1945 until 1970, coolant waters from nuclear reactors at the Hanford Reservation in Washington State were routinely discharged into the Columbia River. In 1991, the General Accounting Office published a document which stated that 444 billion gallons of liquid radioactive wastes, from coolant waters to radioactive liquids, were discharged into the environment from the Hanford site alone.

In Russia, the situation is equally distressing. Nuclear submarines, some still armed with nuclear warheads, are rusting away in the fjords of Murmansk. Elsewhere, rivers have been polluted and open reservoirs and lakes have been used to hold large quantities of liquid radioactive materials. In 1957, a waste storage tank (not unlike those at Hanford) at the Chelyabinsk nuclear weapons site in Russia exploded and a radioactive cloud dispersed over more than 200 square kilometers of an agricultural region containing numerous rivers and lakes. Nearly all the trees within the most radioactive zone were damaged or killed. Radioactive waste has been routinely dumped into Lake Karachay, recognized as the world's most radioactive body of water, also at Chelyabinsk. The highest reading there, recorded near a discharge pipe, was approximately 6 grays per hour, enough radioactivity to give an adult human being a lethal dose in less than one hour.

The environmental damage resulting from nuclear technology is not limited to the two largest nuclear weapons states. All nuclear weapons and nuclear energy producing nations have caused some level of environmental contamination, both in their own countries and abroad - such as, nuclear testing in the South Pacific, Nevada, Kazakhstan, China, India and Pakistan; water and airborne discharges from reprocessing plants in the UK and France; and uranium mining in Namibia, Canada, former East Germany and Australia. Moreover, the ongoing production of both nuclear weapons and nuclear power continues to create nuclear waste. Any long-term approach to 'clean-up' must be tied to a halt in the production of nuclear weapons, weapons usable materials and nuclear power.

The burial of radioactive materials is presently being touted as the 'solution' to radioactive waste 'disposal'. WIPP in New Mexico, Yucca Mountain in Nevada, Gorleben in Germany, proposed sites in the UK, Russia, Australia and elsewhere are among the places where nuclear engineers claim to have 'solved' the nuclear waste problem. However, at present, there are no known disposal routes for long-lived radioactive materials. The burial of these materials must not be confused with their safe containment and isolation from the environment.

c) Economic Effects

There are many secrets surrounding the topic of nuclear weapons, including how much money is spent on nuclear programs. What is certain is that the nuclear-weapon states spend enormous sums of money on maintaining and developing their arsenals. Currently, all nuclear-weapon states are pursuing costly modernisation programs to upgrade and renew their nuclear weapons.

It is difficult to get a handle on what the world's nuclear weapons actually cost, as none of the nuclear-weapon states report their specific costs for nuclear weapons in particular. The United States and the United Kingdom openly report some of their nuclear weapons expenditures, but researchers doubt the total amount that is disclosed.

However, there is official data on the world's total military expenditure. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) annually collects and compiles data on defence costs from all states around the world.

In the US, UK, and France, there is an openness that allows researchers to go through the countries' public finances and try to identify which costs can be linked to nuclear weapons and come up with a close approximation of their cost. Some of these costs are included in the military expenditure, but they can also lie under other items in the budget, which makes the researchers' work more difficult. The costs can also be scattered in different places within the budget and "hidden" under unassuming headings. Certain equipment, for example, aircraft, can also be used both to carry ordinary conventional bombs and nuclear bombs, so-called "dual use", which makes it even more difficult to calculate the actual costs of nuclear weapons.

In the case of the other nuclear weapons states, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, there is no similar openness. For these states, the researchers have made estimates of the costs based on what is believed to be known about their nuclear weapons.

The nuclear-weapon states spend enormous amounts of taxpayers' money on their nuclear weapons, which means that other expenditures and needs in a country are overshadowed. The resources used for nuclear weapons are desperately needed in other areas, such as to fund health care and education. In March 2020, ICAN compared the costs of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States' nuclear weapons programs with the costs of the countries' healthcare.

The sum France spends on its nuclear weapons, €4.55 billion a year, could instead have paid for 100,000 intensive care hospital beds, 10,000 ventilators, and the salaries of 20,000 French nurses and 10,000 French doctors. The £7.2bn a year UK spends on its nuclear weapons program is equivalent to 100,000 intensive care hospital beds, 30,000 ventilators, and the salaries of 50,000 UK nurses and 40,000 UK doctors.

The US nuclear weapons program costs about \$35.1 billion a year. During the coronavirus pandemic, experts warned at the same time that American hospitals needed about 300,000 extra beds in intensive care units and tens of thousands of extra ventilators. The sum the US spends on its nuclear weapons in one year would pay for both those 300,000 extra ICU beds, 35,000 ventilators, and salaries for 150,000 US nurses and 75,000 US doctors.

Another comparison is the budget for UN peacekeeping operations, which was US\$6.38 billion for the 2021/2022 budget year. The peacekeeping operations thus have only a small part in comparison with what the US's nuclear weapons cost. The idea of setting the costs of rearmament against the actual needs of the world is not new. The Thorsson Report, submitted to the UN General Assembly in 1981, was a report on the relationship between disarmament and development. The report was prepared by an expert group led by the Swedish diplomat and peace activist Inga Thorsson.

“The world is over-armed and peace is under-funded.” – Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, 2009.

5) International Law and Agreements

a) UNs Sight upon Nuclear Weapon Usage

Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons on earth. One can destroy a whole city, potentially killing millions, and jeopardizing the natural environment and lives of future generations through its long-term catastrophic effects. The dangers from such weapons arise from their very existence. Although nuclear weapons have only been used twice in warfare, in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, about 13,400 reportedly remain in our world today and there have been over 2,000 nuclear tests conducted to date. Disarmament is the best protection against such dangers, but achieving this goal has been a tremendously difficult challenge.

Regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) have been established to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security. Regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) are treaties binding states in specific regions to prohibit the development, acquisition, testing, or possession of nuclear weapons, strengthening global non-proliferation. Currently, five major treaties exist, covering Latin America (Tlatelolco, 1967), the South Pacific (Rarotonga, 1985), Southeast Asia (Bangkok, 1995), Africa (Pelindaba, 1996), and Central Asia (Semipalatinsk, 2006).

The United Nations has sought to eliminate such weapons ever since its establishment. The first resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1946 established a Commission to deal with problems related to the discovery of atomic energy among others. The Commission was to make proposals for, inter alia, the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes. The resolution also decided that

the Commission should make proposals for “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”

A number of multilateral treaties have since been established with the aim of preventing nuclear proliferation and testing, while promoting progress in nuclear disarmament. These include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests In The Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water, also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was signed in 1996 but has yet to enter into force, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) , which will enter into force on 22 January 2021.

A number of bilateral and plurilateral treaties and arrangements seek to reduce or eliminate certain categories of nuclear weapons, to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and their delivery vehicles. These range from several treaties between the United States of America and Russian Federation as well as various other initiatives, to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

b) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s significance.

The Treaty is regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to further the goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in

the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use. General Assembly Resolutions.

c) International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA was created in 1957 in response to the deep fears and expectations generated by the discoveries and diverse uses of nuclear technology. The Agency's genesis was U.S. President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953.

The U.S. Ratification of the Statute by President Eisenhower, 29 July 1957, marks the official birth of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the press conference following the signing ceremony in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington, D.C., President Eisenhower evoked his address to the UN General Assembly in December 1953, at which he had proposed to establish the IAEA. "In fact, we did no more than crystallize a hope that was developing in many minds in many places ... the splitting of the atom may lead to the unifying of the entire divided world."

The IAEA is strongly linked to nuclear technology and its controversial applications, either as a weapon or as a practical and useful tool. The ideas President Eisenhower expressed in his speech in 1953 helped shape the IAEA's Statute, which 81 nations unanimously approved in October 1956.

The Agency was set up as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization within the United Nations family. From the beginning, it was given the mandate to work with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. The objectives of the IAEA's dual mission – to promote and control the Atom – are defined in Article II of the IAEA Statute.

"The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose."

d) Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

In July 2015, the Islamic Republic of Iran, along with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union, signed on to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement in which Iran would put substantial and verifiable limits on its nuclear science and engineering activities in exchange for sanctions relief. Many observers hailed the agreement as an important, if imperfect, tool

for keeping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Former US President Barack Obama argued that “the United States, our partners, and the world are more secure because of the JCPOA.”

It barely needs to be said that in the United States there was, and is, no shortage of criticism of the agreement. Congressional Republicans and Democrats alike expressed opposition both during JCPOA negotiations and afterwards. Bob Corker, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, argued that the JCPOA would “embolden the world’s leading state sponsor of terror while diminishing our leverage to stop them.” US President Donald Trump has, of course, referred to it as “the worst deal ever.”

While the agreement has eight signatories, two countries, Iran and the United States, have the most at stake. For Iran, the JCPOA lifted financial and trade sanctions that had been imposed on them by the United Nations, the United States and Europe, and that helped fuel an annual inflation rate of over 20 percent and helped cause the Iranian economy to shrink by nearly six percent from 2012 to 2015 (the Iranian economy grew nearly five percent annually over the previous 12 years). For the United States, it put a verifiable, if temporary, cap on Iran’s nuclear science and engineering activities, and thus Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon.

While the JCPOA is not a treaty, US law requires the American president to certify every 90 days that Iran is complying with its JCPOA obligations, and that continuing to waive sanctions against Iran is “vital to the national security interests of the United States.” As expected, Trump, without explicitly finding that Iran is not complying with the JCPOA, refused on October 13 to certify that abiding by the agreement continues to be in America’s interest. Trump further threatened that if Congress (and America’s allies) cannot offer an improved version of the JCPOA (which Tehran would presumably accept), then the United States will withdraw from the agreement. This would mean the wholesale resumption of sanctions.

Now that Trump has decided to decertify, Congress faces the choice of whether to reimpose sanctions on Iran. Determining what effects Trump’s decertification will have requires a close look at the details of the alleged plan. There are three important aspects of the rumoured decertification plan: one procedural and two substantive. As Trump made clear, the White House’s decertification plan is an attempt to coerce Iran into making wholesale changes to its foreign policy.

6) Policies of the Countries

a) Western / Pro-Israel Axis(US Bloc)

-United States

- Israel*
- Saudi Arabia*
- United Arab Emirates (UAE)*
- Egypt*
- Bahrain*
- Jordan*
- Kuwait*

Firstly, the main aim of this US bloc is to ensure that the balance of power is maintained in this region and that its strategic interests are protected. The main aim of this US bloc is to ensure that Iran does not get nuclear weapons. This is because, if Iran is able to get nuclear weapons, this would significantly affect the balance of power in this region. Moreover, this would also threaten Israel.

Secondly, the main aim of this US bloc is to ensure that Israel is secure. In fact, this is done through giving Israel military and political support. Moreover, this is also because of the relation with Gulf countries.

However, this US bloc is accused of having double standards. In fact, this means that they are the ones who are criticizing others for having nuclear weapons, yet they are silent about Israel having nuclear weapons.

The main aim of this US bloc is to:

- Pursue deterrence policies
- Impose sanctions
- Utilize military power as a tool for balance.

b) Resistance Axis(Iran Bloc)

- Iran*
- Syria*
- Lebanon*
- Yemen*
- Iraq*

The Iran Bloc is more concerned with the security of its regime and the decrease of the influence of the US in the region. Iran is a surrounded actor and thus forms its strategy in an aggressive manner.

One of the main objectives of the Iran Bloc is the creation of a balance with Israel and increasing its influence in the region. Iran achieves this in an indirect manner and not by

directly fighting Israel. Iran mainly uses proxy forces to achieve this (for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen).

Iran is also more inclined towards being a 'nuclear threshold state' rather than developing nuclear weapons. This is a strategy to deter and at the same time decrease international pressure on Iran.

However, this strategy is perceived as a threat by other countries in the region and thus increases tensions.

Main Features of the Iran Bloc:

- Asymmetric warfare strategies
- Use of proxy forces
- Strategic deterrence without the use of nuclear weapons.

c) Non-Aligned / Swinged States

- Algeria*
- Libya*
- Morocco*
- Oman*
- Palestine*
- Qatar*
- Tunisia*
- China*
- Russia*
- France*
- United Kingdom*
- Denmark*
- Greece*
- Latvia*
- Colombia*
- Democratic Republic of the Congo*
- Liberia*
- Pakistan*
- Panama*
- Somalia*
- South Africa*
- Chad*

Most countries in the Middle East and around the world have been considered to be either

neutral or non-aligned in this war. The countries include Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, Palestine, China, Russia, France, UK, and many more.

The characteristics associated with such countries:

- Not taking sides in this war.
- Working as mediators in this war.
- Protecting their own interests.

However, one has to bear in mind that being neutral does not always mean that they are not doing anything, as in the case of China, which has been very actively engaged in this war, especially from an economic point of view, and could be considered to be supporting Iran, and Russia, which has been in a dilemma and has to support both Iran and the Western world.

7) What We Expect from You

As the academic team of our committee we have some expectations but before that we will explain the flow of our committee in the conference,

Timeline

- 2028 — Iran expands nuclear program
- 2030 — Regional arms race begins
- 2033 — Nuclear test conducted
- 2035 — UNSC emergency meeting begins

Firstly in this alternative future Iran wants to enter the nuclear war race by expanding their nuclear program in 2028,

Later in 2030 nuclear weaponization war race raises the tensions and the race speeds up,

Nextly first nuclear test is being conducted by Iran in 2033 and this act is one of the final impacts before nuclear war begins,

Finally in 2035 UNSC calls for an emergency meeting for the US axis, Iran Axis and peace based bloc, then our committee begins...

Committee's Flow

Our committee will proceed with the rules of procedure of the GA,

UNSC will have debates to prevent the possible outcome of the world war III by the nuclear war,

The committee will have a resolution paper at the end of the committee to make the solutions agreed and voted on.

Our Expectations

Of course we have some expectations,

Beginning with your efforts before the conference time, we want you to read the study guide and make your own further researches upon your countries' political thoughts and acts, because one of the most important part of our committee is your committees' allies and enemies so you should know it very well,

Next upon your efforts while the conference time, at the conference we would like to see all of you work as hard as you can because we do not want to see loosed potentials,

Finally we want everyone to enjoy their time here, so we are looking forward to seeing that everyone worked hard and came prepared to the committee, ready to face off.

8) Questions to Ponder

- Should nuclear ambiguity be tolerated under international law?**
- How can the UNSC enforce non-proliferation when permanent members have veto power?**
- Would a nuclear-armed Iran truly destabilize the region, or create deterrence?**
- Is a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East realistically achievable?**
- What mechanisms can prevent a regional nuclear arms race?**
- How should the UNSC respond to "threshold states" like Iran?**
- Are current international agreements sufficient or outdated?**
- Can military intervention ever be justified to prevent nuclear proliferation?**